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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,

Case No. 970415-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
Since the state filed its Brief of Appellee in the aboveentitled matter, this Court has issued a decision in State v.
Labrum, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1998) ("Labrum III") ,x
that impacts resolution of many issues raised on appeal in this
case.

For that reason, in this reply brief Appellant Christopher

Cheeney has addressed the Labrum III decision first. (See Point
I, infra.)

In order to facilitate discussion of that case,

Cheeney has taken the arguments out of their original order as
set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, and he has consolidated discussion of several points affected by the decision.
By way of background on the issues raised in the opening
Brief of Appellant and set forth in the Brief of Appellee,
Cheeney has asked this Court to strike Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1 (1995) (the "gang enhancement statute")2 as
unconstitutional for several reasons:
1

This Court's first decision is found at State v. Labrum,
881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994) ("Labrum I"). That decision was
vacated and remanded by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) ("Labrum II"). A petition for
rehearing is pending in Labrum III in this Court.
2

The Utah Supreme Court recognized that Section 76-3-203.1
is "commonly known as the 'gang enhancement7 provision." State v,
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994).

(1) Section 76-3-203.1 fails to specify the standard applicable to the state in proving the statutory elements. Cheeney has
argued the statute is vague under a due process analysis

(Brief

of Appellant, Point III. at 3 0 ) , and lends itself to discriminatory application

(id., Point V. at 3 6 ) . In addition, it violates

Cheeney 7 s right to have the state prove the statutory elements
beyond a reasonable doubt

(id., Points II.B. at 27; IV. at 3 3 ) .

In response to Cheeney's arguments, the state asserts that
because § 76-3-203.1 is a sentencing provision, the state is held
to establishing the statutory elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. According to the state, Cheeney is not entitled to have
the state prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

(State's

Brief, Points II.B. at 28; III. at 31; IV. at 35; V. at 37.)
Labrum III resolves those issues on appeal.

It specifies

that the state must prove the elements set forth in § 76-3-203.1
beyond a reasonable doubt before the trial court may impose the
enhancement against defendant.
37.

Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at

As set forth herein at Point I, the trial court refused to

hold the state to the reasonable-doubt standard under § 76-3203.1.

Thus, this Court should reverse imposition of the

enhancements against Cheeney and remand the case so that the
trial court may hold the state to the reasonable-doubt

standard

in proving the statutory elements.
(2) The statute denies Cheeney's right to have a jury
determine facts that traditionally are elements of a criminal
offense

(Brief of Appellant, Points I. at 8; II.C. at 2 8 ) . Since

2

State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah App. 1997), rejects that
argument, it should be overruled as incorrect.
In response to Cheeney's position, the state asserts that
Ramirez is persuasive notwithstanding its lack of legal analysis.
(State's Brief, Point I. at 7.)
As further set forth herein at Point II, Cheeney maintains
that Ramirez fails to weigh important considerations identified
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), and should be
overruled.
(3) The statute punishes Cheeney for the mental culpability
of others in violation of fundamental fairness and due process
considerations

(Brief of Appellant, Points II.A. at 23; IV. at

3 3 ) . In response to those arguments, the state claims Cheeney
misapprehends the elements that must be proved under the statute.
(State's Brief, Point II.A. at 25.)
The state's claim disregards the Utah Supreme Court's
language in State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994), as
further set forth herein at Point III, infra. This Court should
strike the statute as unconstitutional.
(4) Finally, the state has raised procedural arguments in
response to certain constitutional claims.

Those arguments lack

merit as set forth herein at Point IV, infra.
POINT I. IN RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S POINTS H . B , f III,,
IV., AND V,, THIS COURT'S DECISION IN LABRUM III
COMPELS
REVERSAL OF THE ENHANCEMENTS IN THIS CASE AND REMAND IN
ORDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT MAY CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE.
In the trial court, Cheeney argued that Section 76-3-203.1
was unconstitutional for failing to specify the burden of proof
3

applicable to the state in establishing imposition of the enhancements, and/or that the state must be held to the reasonabledoubt standard in proving the statutory elements. (R. 46-47; 193;
202.) The prosecutor disagreed and claimed the state was "not
bound to any standard of proof [under § 76-3-203.1. . . . If] the
state must prove that defendant acted in concert with two or more
persons for enhancement purposes, then the appropriate standard
is by a preponderance of the evidence." (R. 66.)
The trial court agreed with the state, and rejected
Cheeney's arguments "for the reasons specified in the [state's]
memorandum." (R. 71, 89.)

Thereafter, rather than proceed to a

sentencing hearing where the state "would not be bound to any
standard of proof," or would be bound only to the preponderanceof-evidence standard, Cheeney entered into a conditional guilty
plea on the statutory elements.

(R. 284:4-6; 27-37.)

Cheeney's plea was conditioned on his success in challenging
the trial court's ruling and the constitutionality of § 76-3203.1.

Cheeney maintains that if this Court declines to strike §

76-3-203.1 as unconstitutional, Labrum III provides Cheeney with
a remedy in this case, as set forth below.
A. LABRUM III IDENTIFIED THE STANDARD APPLICABLE TO THE
STATE IN PROVING SECTION 76-3-203.1 ELEMENTS.
In Labrum III, this Court considered the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by the state in support of imposing an enhancement under § 76-3-203.1. To reiterate, § 76-3-203.1 provides
that a person who commits a certain enumerated offense "in concert" with "two or more other persons" is subject to an enhanced
4

penalty. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1) (a) and (b) (1995).

The

statute defines "in concert" by referencing the accomplice
liability statute, Utah Code Ann. 76-2-202 (1995).

Id.

In Labrum III, this Court recognized that reference in the
gang enhancement statute to § 76-2-202 requires proof that the
"other persons" acted with a criminal "mental state" and they
directly committed or solicited, requested, commanded,
encouraged, or aided in the commission of the offense at issue.
Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.

That is, reference to §

76-2-2 02 mandates that to sustain the enhancement, the state must
prove under the reasonable-doubt standard that "other persons"
had a criminal mental state and participated in the offense "in
one of the ways listed" in the statute.
[F]or a person to be "criminally liable" under section 76-2202, the State must prove each element of the offense
[against the other persons] beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, because Behunin did not directly commit the
shooting, to impose the group crime enhancement upon Labrum,
the evidence had to show -- beyond a reasonable doubt -that Behunin solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided Labrum and/or Mills in committing the
shooting. The sentencing court's findings are insufficient
to satisfy this standard.
Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.3

"The quality of [the

involvement of the two or more other persons] must rise to the
level of participation described in section 76-2-202, they must
3

The standard identified in Labrum III is consistent with
Utah law. The elements set forth in § 76-2-202 are traditional
elements of a criminal offense. See State v. Smith, 706 P.2d
1052, 1056 (Utah 1985); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84-85 (Utah
App. 1990), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Thus,
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the elements and proof
of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 706 P.2d at
1056 (jury required to determine § 76-2-202 elements).
5

possess a sufficiently culpable mental state, and the prosecution
must prove the foregoing beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
The state suggests that imposition of the reasonable-doubt
standard is in conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 450.

(State's Brief at 20.)

That is

incorrect. In Alvarez, the court did not discuss the standard of
proof applicable under § 76-3-203.1.

Rather, the court

recognized that for the gang enhancement statute to apply, the
state was not required to prove that the two or more other
persons had the same criminal
461.

mental

state

as defendant. Id. at

Alvarez is not relevant to this issue.
By contrast Labrum III articulated that the state must prove

§ 76-3-203.1 elements under the reasonable-doubt standard.
Labrum III applies here.
B.

LABRUM III

RESOLVES ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL.

1. In Response to the State's Point II.B., Labrum
Resolves the Issue.

III

On appeal, Cheeney has argued that § 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional because it fails on its face to require the state to
prove the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt (Brief of
Appellant, Point IIrB. at 27). The state has responded that the
reasonable-doubt standard is inapplicable here. (See State's
Brief at 28-29: " [B]ecause section 76-3-203.2 is a sentencing
statute, the trial court is not required to make findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.") This Court's decision in Labrum III imposes
the reasonable-doubt standard, thereby resolving the issue.
Although Labrum III does not compel this Court to reverse
6

Cheeney's case on the grounds that the statute is
unconstitutional, remand nevertheless is required. Where the
trial court in Cheeney's case rejected

the reasonable-doubt

standard, its ruling was legally incorrect.
Rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., allows the trial court "to
correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time."

Cheeney is entitled to an order reversing

imposition of the enhancements in this case and remanding the
matter to the trial court for resentencing, where the state will
be required to prove the elements of § 76-3-203.1 beyond a
reasonable doubt to sustain imposition of the enhancements.
2. In Response to the State's Points III. A. 3. and V. ,
Labrum III Resolves the Issues.
At Points III. and V.B. of the opening Brief of Appellant,
Cheeney argued, among other things, that the legislature's
failure to specify the burden of proof applicable to the state in
establishing § 76-3-203.1 elements rendered the statute
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process provisions,
and susceptible to discriminatory application in violation of the
Equal Protection provision of the federal constitution, and the
Uniform Operation of the Laws provision of the state
constitution.

(Brief of Appellant, Points III. at 30; V. at 36.)

The state disagreed.

(State's Brief, Point III.A.3.; Point V. at

p. 40: "[S]ection 76-3-203.1 ... implicitly provides that the
court make a finding based on a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant acted 'in concert with two or more persons.'")
Labrum III in part resolves the constitutional issues
7

identified in Points III. and V.B. of Cheeney's Brief of
Appellant by articulating that the reasonable-doubt standard is
applicable to the state in proving § 76-3-203.1 elements. See
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989) ("[T]his Court has a
duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to ... avoid
and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities");
see also State v. Lindauist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983) .
Since the trial court rejected imposition of the reasonabledoubt standard under § 76-3-203.1, the state was not held to that
burden of proof.

Rather than proceed with the matter under such

conditions, Cheeney conditionally pled to the enhancements in
order to challenge the trial court's ruling.

Inasmuch as the

trial court made a legally incorrect ruling in the matter, enhancement findings were not properly made in this case. The enhancements should be reversed and remanded to correct an illegal
sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (1998); see Point I.B.I, supra.
The state should be held in the trial court to proving § 763-203.1 elements "beyond a reasonable doubt" to sustain imposition of the enhancements, as Cheeney argued in the court below.
3. In Response to the State's Point IV., Labrum
the Standard Urged by Cheeney.

III

Imposes

At Point IV of the opening Brief of Appellant, Cheeney
argued that in connection with sentencing proceedings under § 763-203.1,

defendant is entitled to have the state prove the

statutory elements "beyond a reasonable doubt," as well as to
other due process protections. (Brief of Appellant at 34-36.)
The state disagreed.

(State's Brief, Point IV. at 35.)
8

Labrum III resolves the "reasonable-doubt" issue in
Cheeney's favor. This Court stated that to impose the enhancement
upon a defendant, the state's evidence "had to show -- beyond a
reasonable doubt -- that [the third person] solicited, . . .

or

intentionally aided Labrum and/or [the second person] in
committing the shooting." Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.
Since the trial court rejected the reasonable-doubt standard in
this case, the court's ruling was legally incorrect.

The

enhancements should be reversed and this case should be remanded
for further proceedings consistent with Labrum III.
POINT II, IN RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S POINT I,, RAMIREZ WAS
WRONGLY DECIDED.
In opposition to Cheeney's argument that this Court should
overrule State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah App. 1997) (see
Brief of Appellant, Point I. at 8 ) , the state asserts that
Ramirez is well-reasoned under McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79 (1986). (State's Brief, Point I at 12, 14.)

Yet, the McMillan

"analysis" does not occur in Ramirez, compelling the
determination that Ramirez was incorrectly decided.4
4

The McMillan Court ruled that under the Pennsylvania
sentencing law, defendant was not entitled to have "visible
possession of a firearm" determined under the reasonable-doubt
standard because that factor was not historically an element of a
criminal offense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 90. The Court also
stated the following: "Having concluded that Pennsylvania may
properly treat visible possession as a sentencing consideration
and not an element of any offense, we need only note that there
is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing." Id. at 93.
In McMillan, the analysis relevant to determining the
applicable standard of proof impacted the Court's ruling on the
Sixth Amendment issue. Id.
Since Labrum III resolves the standard-of-proof issue here,
(continued...)
9

To reiterate, the United States Supreme Court in McMillan
recognized that "there are constitutional limits to the State's
power [in defining crimes and prescribing penalties]." McMillan,
477 U.S. at 86.

That is, when a statute denigrates elements of

an offense to sentencing status, and specifies that the
sentencing judge is the trier of fact, the legislature has
crossed permissible constitutional lines.

The analysis in

McMillan begins with that principle.5
Since this Court in Ramirez did not address that principle,
it should be considered.

Labrum III has taken the first step by

defining elements that must be proved to sustain imposition of
the enhancement. In Labrum III, this Court held that in order to
impose the enhancement against defendant, the state must show
criminal accomplice liability in the commission of the offense of
two or more other persons.
That is, the state at least must prove accomplice liability
and every element of a criminal offense with respect to the two
or more other persons.
Accordingly, because [the third person] did not
directly commit the shooting, to impose the group crime
enhancement upon Labrum, the evidence had to show ... that
[the third person] solicited, requested, commanded,
4

(...continued)
Cheeney addresses the impact of the McMillan analysis only as it
relates to his right to a jury and as set forth in Ramirez.
5

Incidentally, Cheeney does not assert that "McMillan is
inapplicable" as claimed by the state. (State's Brief at 8.)
Rather, Cheeney asserts that "circumspect consideration of Utah's
statute under McMillan compels the determination that the
sentencinQ
label
placed on the elements set forth in § 76-3-203.1
must be rejected." (Brief of Appellant at 11 (emphasis added).)
10

encouraged, or intentionally aided Labrum and/or [the second
person] in committing the shooting. The sentencing court's
findings are insufficient to satisfy this standard.
"Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make
one an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates,
encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime." Thus,
[the third person's] presence during the shooting's planning
and commission, whether he knew it was going to occur or
not, was insufficient to impose criminal liability under
section 76-2-202. Likewise, [the third person's] presence
during Labrum's subsequent boasting, even if accompanied by
some measure of strutting or posturing on [the third
person's] part, and his burning the newspaper article, do
not establish criminal liability under section 76-2-202.
•

*

•

Under this statute, it is not enough that others were
present when the crime was committed. Rather, the quality of
their involvement must rise to the level of participation
described in section 76-2-202, they must possess a
sufficiently culpable mental state.
Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37 (cites omitted).
Once the elements to be proved under the sentencing
provision are identified, McMillan asks whether such elements
have "always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on
punishment."

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90.

In McMillan, the

Court recognized that the "instrumentality used in committing the
violent felony" was a traditional sentencing element. Id. In this
case, the question is whether accomplice liability is a
traditional sentencing factor.6
Contrary to the state's assertions (see State's Brief at 16
6

Cheeney is not necessarily arguing that the legislature is
allowed to identify only "simple facts as [] sentencing considerations," as the state asserts. (State's Brief at 17, 18.) Cheeney
maintains that the query concerns whether the legislature has
taken traditional elements of an offense and relegated them to a
sentencing status. Issues of criminal mental culpability traditionally are complicated, substantive elements based in circumstantial evidence. Such elements are afforded greater protection
with the heightened burden of proof -- beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Addinaton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
11

& n. 6 7 ), § 76-2-202 elements traditionally are substantive

7

The state cites to case law in other jurisdictions to
assert that courts traditionally consider "in concert" conduct or
"accomplice" liability as sentencing factors. Those cases do not
support the state's position for several reasons:
(1) The courts did not consider accomplice or "in concert"
liability as the relevant factor in imposing harsher sentences.
In U.S. v. Sutherland, 890 F.2d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989),
the trial court increased the sentence upon finding that "more
than minimal planning" was involved in the commission of the
offense. Defendant's planning consisted of organizing others to
assist in the crime. The court was not concerned with accomplice
liability, but with the level of planning involved. In People v.
Mahone, 614 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the more
severe sentence was imposed because of the defendant's
"calculated scheme."
"Accomplice" involvement was incidental.
In Commonwealth v. Darden, 531 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. 1987),
the court did not consider "accomplice liability" as an
aggravating factor. Rather, the court focused on appellant's
"victimization of a [defenseless] seventy-year-old woman" as
"substantial."
Id. 1149 (emphasis in original) & 1150.
In State v. Dennis, 728 P.2d 1075, 1077-78 (Wash. App.
1987), defendants gang raped the victim. The court looked to
other jurisdictions, which upheld upward departures where a lone
actor "alternately and forcibly penetrated [the victim] in the
vagina and anus." The Dennis court found that subjecting the
victim to multiple penetrations and two-forms of penetration
justified imposition of exceptional sentences. Id. at 1078; see
also Miller v. State, 866 P.2d 130 (Alaska 1994) (aggravating
factor concerned "risk of imminent physical injury" in commission
of offense to persons other than accomplices).
(2) In the following cases, accomplice liability served as a
basis for charging the defendants. Consequently, the accomplice
liability elements were substantive elements of the criminal offense, entitling defendant to a jury determination and proof beyond a reasonable doubt: Dixon v. State, 891 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Ark.
1 9 9 5 ) ; State v. Lanqford, 837 P.2d 1037 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1992),
cert, denied, 510 U.S. 838 (1993).
(3) In People v. Banks, 632 N.E.2d 257 (111. App. 1994), the
trial court made a comment concerning defendant's and the
victims 7 membership in rival gangs. The appellate court found
that the reference to the "rival gang situation" was not used "in
aggravation at all" in determining sentencing. Id. at 265.
(4) In DeGross v. State, 816 P.2d 212 (Alaska App. 1991),
whether defendant "was the leader of a group of three or more
persons (AS 12.55.-155 (c) (3)) , " id. at 216 n. 1 & 2, was considered as an aggravating sentencing factor. The court did not
discuss application of that factor. The lack of discussion is not
helpful here.
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elements of an offense.

See Smith, 706 P.2d at 1056 (requiring

proof from state of each element set forth in § 76-2-202 to
support conviction of offense); Webb, 790 P.2d at 84 (defendant
properly convicted as accomplice where elements of § 76-2-202 are
proved). Thus, under the McMillan analysis, relegation of the
elements to sentencing status is impermissible.
The state next argues that the Court in Ramirez "summarily
adopted the analysis used in McMillan, and found that section 763-203.1 correctly provided for a penalty enhancement." (State's
Brief at 16.)

However, as recognized by the state, the summary

analysis in Ramirez simply constituted "observation" -- without
more - - o f the following: (1) Pennsylvania could have defined
underlying offenses to include visible possession as an element
but it declined to do so; (2) "possession of a firearm under the
Pennsylvania act is not an element of the proscribed offense," it
is considered only after defendant has been found guilty of the
underlying offense; (3) "the enhancement implies no presumption
of guilt based on the facts of the case, nor is the prosecution
relieved of its burden of proving the defendant guilty" on the
underlying offense; (4) the enhancement does not extend
incarceration beyond the maximum term provided for commission of
the underlying felony, but rather it limits trial court
discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already
available; (5) "The statute gives no impression of having been
tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense;" and (6) the
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Pennsylvania legislature took a factor that was always considered
by sentencing courts to bear on punishment -- the instrumentality
used in committing a violent felony -- and dictated the precise
weight to be given that factor. (State's Brief at 13-14.)
According to the state, the above "observations" controvert
the determination that facts set forth in Section 76-3-203.1 must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

(State's Brief at 12-16.)

As set forth in Point I, supra, Labrum III resolves the issue
concerning the applicable standard of proof here. Notwithstanding
Labrum III, the state's "observations" are superficial,
compelling reversal of Ramirez.

See note 4, supra.

With respect to the state's first observation, although the
legislature may create an enhancement that requires proof of
certain elements to the judge during sentencing, the fact that a
legislature has created an enhancement does not immunize the
legislation from being scrutinized by the courts for
constitutional violations. "There are constitutional limits to
the State's power [in defining crimes and prescribing
penalties]."

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.

The state's observation

(1) is not "analysis"; rather, it is an incomplete statement
concerning legislative power.
The state's observation (2) is actually a continuation of
observation (1). According to the state, because the legislature
has provided that the enhancement "operates only after the
defendant has been found guilty" on the underlying offense, the
enhancement is a sentencing provision.
14

Observation (2) is not

"analysis."

Rather, the analysis

relevant to observations (1)

and (2) concerns whether the "sentencing" elements are
traditional sentencing considerations.

As set forth in the

opening Brief and herein, the elements identified at §§ 76-3203.1 and 76-2-202 are traditional elements of an offense. Under
McMillan, Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional.
The state's observation (3) is irrelevant in light of Labrum
III.

The state is held to the reasonable-doubt standard in

proving the § 76-3-203.1 elements.
With respect to observation (4), Utah's sentencing scheme
differs from the Pennsylvania sentencing scheme identified in
McMillan. Under Pennsylvania law, the sentencing judge designated
the number of years, within a specified range, that the accused
would serve for committing a crime. That is, for a particular
felony, the accused may be sentenced to serve 1 to 10 years.

The

judge specified the precise number of years to be served.
Utah's sentencing laws operate in a different manner. Under
Utah's structure, "a trial court has no discretion in sentencing
a defendant to a certain number of years in prison."

State v.

Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980).
Under the Utah indeterminate sentencing laws, the minimum
number of years triggers parole considerations.

See State v.

Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995) (Board of Pardons makes
reasoned decisions concerning incarceration beyond minimum
sentence). Thus, the minimum

number

of years

is more important to

the defendant, while an increase in the maximum number
15

of years

of incarceration may be inconsequential.

See Utah Code Ann. §

76-3-401 (Supp. 1997).
Specifically, as pointed out in Cheeney's opening brief, if
the minimum number of years to be served is increased, it is the
equivalent of sentencing Cheeney to serve consecutive, numerous,
additional sentences for second degree felony offenses.

(Brief

of Appellant, Point I.B.2. at 17); see also note 8, herein. The
impact on sentencing is more profound than if Cheeney's maximum
term had been increased, or Cheeney had been found guilty of
committing several additional felony offenses, and sentenced to
serve consecutive terms.
By disregarding the distinctions between the Utah and
Pennsylvania sentencing schemes, the state has promoted a
meaningless analysis.

Surely the United States Supreme Court did

not expect that under McMillan, courts would simply inquire
blindly as to whether the "maximum term" is extended. Such an
analysis serves no purpose under the Utah scheme.

The analytical

question is whether the enhancement has a profound effect on the
sentence.

It does under the Utah structure.

That brings us to observation (5). The state asserts the
"tail-wagging-the-substantive-offense" metaphor means that the
"Pennsylvania statute imposed no increase in the maximum
penalty." (State's Brief at 17.)

To the extent the metaphor

carries such a meaning under McMillan, the state has failed to
explain the metaphor's application in the context of the Utah
sentencing structure.

Here, Cheeney was sentenced for committing
16

second and third degree felony offenses.

The trial court ordered

him to serve the sentences concurrently.

Under the Utah scheme,

Cheeney may be eligible for parole after having served the
aggregate of the minimum term on the two offenses: one year.
However, imposition of the enhancements in this case has
increased Cheeney's eligibility period for parole from one year
to six years.8

Where Cheeney would have served a minimum of one

year for the offenses without the enhancements, he is now serving
a minimum of six years.

Under the Utah scheme, imposition of the

enhancements has increased Cheeney's incarceration six fold
before he will be considered eligible for parole.

That increase

is significant. The "tail" is "wagging" the "dog."
Finally, with respect to observation (6), as set forth at
note 7, supra, the state is unable to cite to authority in
support of the notion that "in concert" or accomplice liability
is a factor that has always been considered to bear on punishment. Observation (6) does not support the state's position.
The state concludes its "analysis" by asserting that the six
observations comprise the test for determining whether a sentence
enhancement actually defines a separate offense. It reiterates
8

Cheeney originally asserted in the opening brief that the
aggregate total number of minimum years of incarceration in his
case is nine years, then amended the brief to reflect that the
aggregate number of minimum years of incarceration is seven
years. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.B.2. at 17.) Cheeney is mistaken. As the state points out, the total number of minimum years
of incarceration is six years. This Court in Labrum I made that
clear: the "gang enhancement increases [the] minimum term to six
years." Labrum I, 881 P.2d at 902 n. 4. Thus, the trial court's
language in Cheeney's case that the enhancement is imposed
"consecutively and not concurrently" (R. 92 and 94) is incorrect.
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that because the legislature "has the prerogative to prescribe a
criminal offense" and has specified in § 76-3-203.1 that the
statute "does not create any separate offense," the statute
passes constitutional muster. (State's Brief at 18-19.) Fortunately, McMillan does not sanction such a superficial analysis.
For the reasons set forth in the opening brief, Cheeney
maintains that this Court should reject the sentencing label
placed on Section 76-3-203.1 and recognize the statute for what
it is: an attempt to circumvent a defendant's fundamental right
to have a jury determine traditional elements.

Ramirez should be

overruled on the grounds that it is incorrect.
POINT III. CASES CITED IN THE STATE'S POINT II.A. SUPPORT
THE DETERMINATION THAT § 76-3-203.1 MUST BE ESTABLISHED WITH
PROOF THAT DEFENDANT HAD AN "IN CONCERT" MENS REA.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, the Utah
Supreme Court recognized in State v. Alvarez that a defendant may
be criminally responsible for an act committed by another but
only to the extent the state has established defendant's criminal
mental culpability. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461; (Brief of
Appellant, Point II.A. at 23).

In that regard, Cheeney maintains

that unless § 76-3-203.1 is interpreted to require the state to
prove, among other things, (1) that defendant committed the
underlying offense and (2) that defendant had an "in-concert" or
an accomplice mens

rea,

the statute is unconstitutional. The

following scenarios illustrate Cheeney's point:
Assume persons A and B assault victim.

Defendant C may be

criminally liable for the offense but only to the extent the
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evidence supports that C had a criminal mens
with the commission of the assault.

rea

in connection

Since C was not an actor,

his culpability may be established under § 76-2-202 with proof
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or aided in
the assault, or under Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995) with proof
that he had an agreement with A and/or B to commit the assault.
Establishing that C solicited the commission of the
underlying offense or entered into an agreement concerning the
offense may be sufficient to establish both a conviction on the
offense and that C had an "in-concert" or accomplice mens

rea.

That is, he intended the commission of the offense in concert
with two or more other persons, as set forth in Labrum III.
On the other hand, if C is an actor and the state establishes his liability on the underlying offense, that should not
be sufficient to also establish the "in-concert" mental
culpability against C.
C's

accomplice

The state also should be required to show

liability,

or that C intended the participation of

two or more other persons for imposition of the enhancement as
set forth in Labrum III.

Hence, in addition to mandating that C

had the required mental state for the criminal act, the state
should be required to prove an accomplice or "in concert"
rea

against C.

mens

Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.

Stated another way, proof that three persons each were
liable for the offense should not be sufficient to prove "in
concert" conduct against

defendant.

Such proof without more

should only be sufficient to penalize each person individually
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for his part in the commission of the underlying crime.
If the state is required to prove only the independent
mental culpability on the underlying offense and accomplice
liability on the part of the two or more other persons to
the

enhancement

against

defendant,

impose

defendant effectively will be

punished more harshly for the independent mental culpability of
other persons. Cheeney maintains that Alvarez forbids such a
result. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461 ("A defendant can be criminally
responsible for an act committed by another, but the degree of
his responsibility is determined by his own mental state")
(citing State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983)).
In response to Cheeney's argument, the state asserts proof
of an "in-concert" mental culpability is not necessary in part
because "the circumstance in which an actor is actually unaware
of 'in concert' participation by two or more others sufficient to
impose the enhancement is remote." (State's Brief at 27-28.)
Although the state fails to explain that statement, it seems to
acknowledge that § 76-3-2 03.1 will serve to enhance a penalty
against defendant based on proof that two or more others
committed the offense and had accomplice liability, even though
defendant neither intended nor was aware of the "in concert"
participation.
The state also asserts that § 76-3-203.1 "does not unfairly
result in an enhanced sentence" even though it does not require
that defendant "have knowledge of others acting in concert with
him."

(State's Brief at 27.)

The state apparently relies on the
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following cases in support of that proposition: State v.
Lanaford, 837 P.2d at 1037, and Dixon v. State, 891 S.W.2d 59, 60
(Ark. 1995) .

Langford and Dixon do not support the state's

position in part because they are not sentencing cases.
Indeed, Langford and Dixon support the determination that

based on proof
defendant's

of defendant's

participation

accomplice

liability

in the underlying

may be prosecuted for a greater crime.

offense,

and proof

of

defendant

Those cases support

Cheeney's position.
In Langford, the principal actor stabbed and killed another
individual during a fistfight.

The principal was charged with

second degree murder, and the other defendants involved in the
fight were charged as accomplices. Langford, 837 P.2d at 1037.
The other defendants argued they could not be held liable for
murder because they did not know the principal was armed with a
knife.

Id. at 1041.

In considering the issue, the Washington

court recognized that to sustain the murder conviction against
the other defendants, the state was required to prove their
involvement in the commission of the underlying offense (in that
case the others were involved in the assault), and their
accomplice liability.

Id.

The court reiterated that the accomplice liability statute
premised criminal liability for the greater offense of murder "on
the accomplice's general knowledge [that] he was assisting
principal

in

committing

a crime,

the

not upon his specific knowledge
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of the elements of the principal's crime." Id. at 1041 (emphasis
added); see also Dixon, 891 S.W.2d at 60.
Contrary to the state's assertions, Langford and Dixon require both proof of defendant's involvement in commission of a
crime, and proof that defendant assisted the principal, in order
to sustain the conviction for the greater offense.

In each case,

the state had to prove a specific "accomplice" liability element
against defendant to sustain the greater conviction for murder.
Thus, defendants had the right to a jury and the state was held
to proving such elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendants

were entitled to all relevant constitutional guarantees before
they could be convicted "based on the unplanned acts" of the
principal. (State's Brief at 28.)
The state's cases support Cheeney's argument that in order
to impose a harsher penalty against defendant for the actions of
others, defendant's "accomplice" mens

rea

must be established.

In connection with proving such elements the state must be held
to the reasonable-doubt standard, and defendant is entitled to
have the issues presented to the jury as elements of the offense.
Since Section 76-3-203.1 fails to accommodate those fundamental
guarantees, it is unconstitutional and should be stricken.
POINT IV. AS A FINAL MATTER, THE STATE INCORRECTLY ASSERTS
THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS RAISED BY CHEENEY ARE
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE SINCE CHEENEY CONDITIONALLY
"ADMITTED" TO THE IN-CONCERT CONDUCT.
In response to some of Cheeney's constitutional issues, the
state has peppered its brief with claims that the issues should
not be addressed since "[Cheeney] admitted and his counsel
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acknowledged the ['in concert'] participation of two or more
others (R. 125, 184[4])." (State's Brief at 28; 31 ("party liability [is not] at serious issue in this case based on defendant's and defendant's counsel's acknowledgements that defendant
acted in concert with two or more other persons"); 32-33.)
The state in part is claiming that because Cheeney entered
into the conditional plea agreement and conditionally admitted to
elements of the enhancement provision, he is prevented now from
raising certain constitutional issues on appeal.

(State's Brief

at 28, 31-33.) The state's assertions are legally incorrect.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, the state
charged Cheeney with several offenses and provided notice that
the state would seek enhancements under § 76-3-203.1. (R. 8-12.)
Cheeney moved to strike the statute as unconstitutional (R. 4048; 161-258), and the trial court rejected Cheeney's arguments.
(R. 89-90.) In connection with the motion to strike, the state
and Cheeney entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(i),
Utah R. Crim. P., and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
1988), wherein Cheeney pled conditionally guilty to imposition of
the enhanced penalties in this case.

(R. 27-37; 284:4-6.) In

addition, the state agreed that Cheeney could appeal the
constitutionality of § 76-3-203.1 to this Court. The trial court
accepted the terms of the agreement. (R. 27-37; 284:7-8.)
In effect, Cheeney's admissions under § 76-3-203.1 are without prejudice. That is, in the event this Court reverses or
remands imposition of the enhancements here, it would be patently
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unfair for the state to use the conditional admissions set forth
in the plea agreement against Cheeney.

By the same token, the

state should be precluded from relying on the admissions in
response to Cheeney's constitutional claims on appeal.
The state, as a party to the plea agreement, promised that
Cheeney could raise the constitutional issues on appeal to this
Court. The agreement serves as an acknowledgement by the parties
that all matters argued with respect to the constitutionality of
the gang enhancement statute are preserved and will be addressed
on the merits without procedural posturing.
The state cannot be allowed to stipulate and agree to this
Court's review of the constitutionality of the statute at the
trial court level, then claim procedural defects, i.e. standing,
in this Court.

Such an argument reflects the state's

unwillingness to satisfy the conditions of the agreement. Cheeney
is entitled to recision of the agreement or specific performance.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (if government breaches plea agreement, court can
permit recision or specific performance; defendant's preference
should be accorded considerable, if not controlling, weight).
Since Cheeney is seeking a merits review of the issues on appeal
as anticipated by the parties in the trial court, Cheeney
respectfully requests that this Court judicially enforce the plea
agreement against the state by rejecting the procedural
arguments.

See U.S. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 924 F.2d 928, 937

(9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (plea agreement is
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judicially enforceable against government).
With regard to the merits of the state's procedural claims,
Cheeney has standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 763-203.1. According to State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996),
if a litigant can show that a favorable ruling concerning the
challenged statute will ease the litigant's injury, the litigant
has standing to raise the constitutional issue. Id. at 1379.

If

this Court finds here that the trial court's ruling is incorrect
and/or that § 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional, the enhancement
should be vacated and the matter remanded accordingly. Such a
favorable ruling will ease the enhancements imposed in this case.
Cheeney has standing to raise the issues on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Labrum III compels reversal of the enhancements in this case
and remand in order that the trial court may correct an illegal
sentence. In addition, for the reasons set forth above and more
fully in the opening Brief, Cheeney respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the enhancements imposed against him on the
basis that § 76-3-203.1 violates numerous federal and state
constitutional provisions.
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